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Abstract
The 1870-1913 period marked the birth of the ￿rst era of trade globalization. How did this
tremendous increase in trade a⁄ect economic development? This work isolates a causality chan-
nel by exploiting the fact that the steamship produced an asymmetric change in trade distances
among countries. Before the invention of the steamship, trade routes depended on wind patterns.
The introduction of the steamship in the shipping industry reduced shipping costs and time in a
disproportionate manner across countries and trade routes. Using this source of variation and a
completely novel set of data on shipping times, trade, and development that spans the great major-
ity of the world between 1850 and 1900, I ￿nd that 1) the adoption of the steamship was the major
reason for the ￿rst wave of trade globalization, 2) only a small number of countries that were char-
acterized by more inclusive institutions bene￿ted from globalization, and 3) globalization exerted
a negative e⁄ect on both urbanization rates and economic development in most other countries.
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11 Introduction
The 1870-1913 period marked the birth of the ￿rst era of trade globalization. As shown in Figure
(1), between 1820 and 1913, the world experienced an unprecedented increase in world trade, with
a marked acceleration that began in 1870. This increase in trade cannot simply be explained by
increased global GDP or population. In fact, between 1870 and 1913, the world export-to-GDP
ratio increased from 5 percent to 9 percent, while per-capita volumes more than tripled. The
determinants and consequences of this ￿rst wave of globalization have been of substantial interest
to both economists and historians. This study employs new trade data and a novel identi￿cation
strategy to empirically investigate 1) the role of the adoption of the steamship in spurring trade
after 1870 and 2) the e⁄ect of this tremendous increase in world trade on economic development.
This paper isolates a causality channel by exploiting the fact that the steamship produced an
asymmetric change in shipping times across countries. Before the invention of the steamship, trade
routes depended on wind patterns. The adoption of the steam engine reduced shipping times in a
disproportionate manner across countries and trade routes. For instance, because the winds in the
Northern Atlantic Ocean follow a clockwise pattern, the duration of a round trip with a clipper
ship from Lisbon to Cape Verde would be similar to that of a round trip from Lisbon to Salvador.
With the steamship, the former trip would require only half of the time needed for the latter trip.
These asymmetric changes in shipping times across countries are used to identify the e⁄ect of the
adoption of the steamship on trade patterns and volumes and to explore the e⁄ect of international
trade on economic development.
This paper is based on an impressive data collection as it uses three completely novel datasets
that span the great majority of the world from 1850 to 1900. The ￿rst dataset provides information
on shipping times using di⁄erent sailing technologies across approximately 16,000 country pairs. The
second dataset consists of more than 23,000 bilateral trade observations for nearly one thousand
distinct country pairs and approximately 5,000 observations pertaining to the total exports of
these countries. Finally, the third dataset provides information on urbanization rates worldwide.
2These data are then combined with more traditional resources on per-capita income and population
density.
Four key ￿ndings emerge from this analysis.
First, regressions of bilateral trade on shipping times by both sail and steam vessels between
1850 and 1900 reveal that trade patterns were shaped by shipping times by sail until 1860, by a
weighted average of shipping times by sail and steam between 1860 and 1870, and by shipping
times by steam thereafter.
Second, I demonstrate that changes in the geographical isolation of a country (i.e., the average
shipping time from this country to the remainder of the world) induce substantial e⁄ects on its
trade volumes. Using these estimates, I argue that the reduction in shipping times induced by the
steam engine is responsible for approximately half of the increase in international trade during the
second half of the nineteenth century.
Third, the predictions for bilateral trade generated by the regressions of trade on shipping times
by sail and steam vessels are then summed to generate a panel of overall trade predictions for 129
countries from 1850 to 1900. These predictions can be used as instruments in panel regressions of
trade on urbanization rates, population density and per-capita income and the time series variation
of the instrument allows for the inclusion of time- and country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects in the second-
stage regression. I ￿nd that the e⁄ect of trade on urbanization and development is not necessarily
positive. Although trade appears to be bene￿cial for a small set of core countries, it is actually
detrimental to the majority of countries.
Finally, in the last section of the paper, I provide evidence that the quality of institutions is
crucial to bene￿ting from international trade. Speci￿cally, the e⁄ect of trade on economic develop-
ment is bene￿cial for countries characterized by strong constraints on executive power, a distinct
feature of the institutional environment that has been demonstrated to favor private investments.
By contrast, in countries characterized by absolute power, the ￿rst wave of globalization exerted a
clearly negative e⁄ect.
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the ￿rst work that quanti￿es the e⁄ects of the
3adoption of the steamship on global trade volumes and economic development in a well-identi￿ed
empirical framework. This work also contributes to several strands of the economic literature.
First, my ￿ndings contribute to the debate on the importance of reduced transportation costs in
spurring international trade during the ￿rst wave of globalization. The most widely held perspective
on the nineteenth century is that while railroads were responsible for promoting within-country in-
tegration, steamships served the same role in promoting cross-country integration (Frieden (2007);
James (2001)). However, this view is not re￿ ected in the most recent empirical literature examining
the ￿rst wave of trade globalization (O￿ Rourke and Williamson (1999), Estervadeordal et al. (2003),
Jacks et al. (2011)). In particular, these studies have emphasized the role of income growth when
focusing on explaining the increase in absolute trade and the role of the combination of decreasing
transportation costs and the adoption of the gold standard when focusing on trade shares. The
typical methodology applied in this literature is to regress exports on freight rates and then to
calculate what share of the increase in trade after 1870 can be explained by the contemporane-
ous reduction in freight rates. My paper addresses a major identi￿cation issue: freight rates are
endogenous because they are likely to be a⁄ected not only by technology but also by changes in
economic activity or market structure. Additionally, my work is the ￿rst to extend the period of
analysis before 1870. This extended period is necessary to capture the transition period from sail
to steam vessels and to explain the sources of the structural break in trade data after 1870.
Second, my ￿ndings contribute to the debate on the e⁄ects of trade on development. Although
I am not aware of any paper that identi￿es a causal link in the nineteenth century, a large body of
literature has focused on more recent years. Beginning with the seminal work of Frankel and Romer
(1999), a large number of papers have attempted to identify a causal channel using a geographic
instrument: the point-to-point great circle distance across countries. Although this instrument
is free of reverse causality, it is correlated with geographic di⁄erences in outcomes that are not
generated through trade. For instance, countries that are closer to the equator generally have
longer trade routes and may have low incomes because of unfavorable disease environments or
unproductive colonial institutions. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and others have demonstrated
4that Frankel and Romer (1999) results are not robust to the inclusion of geographic controls in the
second stage. More recently, Feyrer (2009b) and Feyrer (2009a) exploit two natural experiments:
the closing of the Suez Canal between 1967 and 1975 and improvements in aircraft technology that
generated asymmetric shocks in trade distances. Feyrer ￿nds that an increase in trade exerts large
positive e⁄ects on economic development. My work demonstrates that although trade has been
proven to exert generally positive e⁄ects on development in the present day, this might have not
been the case one century ago.
Third, my ￿ndings contribute to the theoretical debate between neoclassical trade theories, in
which comparative advantages are determined by technological di⁄erences and factor endowments,
and new economic geography theories, in which countries derive part of their comparative advan-
tage from scale economies. Trade liberalization in the conventional Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin
approach allows countries to exploit their comparative advantage: greater integration may harm
particular interest groups but typically increases income in all countries. This view has been chal-
lenged by the new economic geography theories (see, for instance, Krugman (1991), Krugman and
Venables (1995), Baldwin et al. (2001) and Crafts and Venables (2007)). Although production has
constant returns to scale in the neoclassical world, these theories are based on increasing returns
within ￿rms and in the economy more broadly. Speci￿cally, production in agriculture is still mod-
eled with constant returns, whereas production in manufacturing now shows increasing returns to
scale. When trade costs are su¢ ciently high, a reduction in trade costs together with localized
externalities1 causes a process of industrial agglomeration that is bene￿cial for countries that spe-
cialize in manufacturing and detrimental to countries that specialize in agriculture. My empirical
￿ndings support this second strand of literature, as the ￿rst wave of trade globalization clearly had
positive e⁄ects for a small core of countries while exerting negative e⁄ects for other countries.
Finally, my ￿ndings speak to a signi￿cant body of empirical literature, beginning with the
seminal contributions of Acemoglu et al. (2001), Engerman and Sokolo⁄(1994), and La Porta et al.
1In Krugman (1991), external economies arise from the desire of ￿rms to establish their facilities close to cus-
tomers/workers; in Krugman and Venables (1995), externalities arise from linkages between ￿rms; and in Baldwin,
Martin and Ottaviano (2001), externalities arise from capital accumulation in the manufacturing sector.
5(1997)2, that has convincingly shown that strong institutions (e.g., with respect to shareholder
protection, the strength of contract enforcement, property rights) are critical for economic growth.
Levchenko (2007) demonstrates that in a model containing di⁄erences in contracting imperfections
across countries, trade is bene￿cial for countries characterized by the strongest institutions and
detrimental to others. To the best of my knowledge, my work presents the ￿rst assessment of this
theory and provides an empirical basis for an additional channel through which institutions a⁄ect
economic development.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the evolution of shipping
technology during the second half of the nineteenth century. Section 3 describes the construction
of shipping times, trade ￿gures and other data used in the paper. Section 4 describes the e⁄ects
of the introduction of the steamship in the shipping industry on global patterns and volumes of
international trade. Section 5 examines the e⁄ect of trade on urbanization, population density and
per-capita GDP as well as the role of institutions. Some concluding remarks close the paper.
2 From sail to steam
The nineteenth century marked an era of spectacular advancements in terms of economic integration
throughout the world. It is generally believed that while the construction of new railroads fostered
within-country economic integration, the introduction of steam vessels in the shipping industry
encouraged cross-country integration. In fact, the great majority of international trade in this
period was conducted by sea (see Table (A.1) in the appendix). The reductions in trade costs
between countries, however, were not uniform across trade routes. To illustrate the asymmetric
e⁄ects on international patterns of trade induced by the shift from sail to steam, in what follows I
describe the two competing technologies and their evolution in the second half of the century.
2Studies on the e⁄ects of history on long-lasting institutions have built on an earlier body of literature dating back
to North and Thomas (1973), North (1981), and North (1990). For a complete review, see Nunn (2009).
62.1 The sailing vessels
Figure (2) describes the polar diagram of a clipper, a fast-sailing ship that had three or more masts
and a square rig and that was largely used for international trade during the nineteenth century.
A polar diagram is a compact means of graphing the relationship between the speed of a sailing
vessel and the angle and strength of the wind. A clipper cannot navigate against the wind as every
other sailing vessels, and it reaches its maximum speed when sailing downwind at 140 degrees o⁄
the wind. Additionally, wind speed a⁄ects the speed of the vessel, which is maximized when the
wind is moving at 24 knots. Given this technology, the prevailing direction and speed of winds
become important determinants shaping the main international trade routes. Figure (3) describes
the prevailing wind patterns worldwide, and Figure (4) depicts a series of journeys made by British
ships between 1800 and 1860 across England, Cape of Good Hope and Java. For instance, winds
tend to follow a clockwise pattern in the North Atlantic; thus, it is much easier, from Western
Europe, to sail westward after traveling south 30 N latitude and reaching the ￿trade winds,￿thus
arriving in the Caribbean, rather than traveling straight to North America. The result is that, trade
systems historically tended to follow a triangular pattern among Europe, Africa, the West Indies
and the United States. Furthermore, because South Atlantic winds tend to blow counterclockwise,
British ships would not sail directly southward to the Cape of Good Hope; rather, they would ￿rst
sail southwest toward Brazil and then move east to the Cape of Good Hope at 30 S latitude.
In summary, given this technology, geographical distances might not be a strong predictor of
the trade distance between di⁄erent ports and countries.
2.2 The steam vessels
The invention and subsequent development of the steamship represents a watershed event in mar-
itime transport. For the ￿rst time, vessels were not at the mercy of winds, and trade routes became
independent of wind patterns.
The ￿rst steamship prototypes emerged in the early 1800s. In 1786, John Fitch built the ￿rst
steamboat, which subsequently operated in regular commercial service along the Delaware River.
7The early steamboats were small wooden vessels using low-pressure steam engines and paddle
wheels. Paddles were replaced by screw propellers and wooden hulls by iron hulls beginning in the
1840s.
Steam ￿rst displaced sail on shorter routes and in passenger trade. Ine¢ cient engines prevented
these early steamships from being used in long-distance bulk trade, as longer voyages meant that
a greater proportion of a ship￿ s capacity needed to be devoted to coal bunkers rather than cargo.
Engine e¢ ciency was increased substantially when Elder and Radolph patented their compound
engine in 1853, although its e⁄ective use was delayed until the introduction of higher-pressure
boilers in the following decade. Figure (5) documents the dramatic reduction in coal consumption
during the second half of the nineteenth century: between 1855 and 1870, the coal consumption per
horsepower per hour of the average British steamship declined by more than half. This dramatic
reduction in coal consumption, in conjunction with the increase in the number of the bunkering
deposits, made steamship technology competitive even in long-distance trade. The transition was
rapid. Figure (6) presents an aggregate representation of the transition from sail to steam. In
1869, the tonnage of British steam vessels engaged in international trade cleared in English ports
surpassed that of British sailing vessels for the ￿rst time. Moreover, whereas sail powered more
than two-thirds of the tonnage of ships built in the 1860s, this percentage declined to 15 percent
during the early 1870s.
By the end of the 1880s, sailing vessels were still in use only in round-the-world trade, in the
Australian trade and in trade to the west coast of the Americas. Finally, by 1910, the shift from
sailing vessels to steamships was complete, and sailing vessels ceased to be used on a large scale in
international trade.
3 Data
The dataset covers 129 countries from 1850 to 1900. (For a complete list of countries and data
coverage, see Table (A.2) in the appendix.) The countries are de￿ned by their borders as of 1900.
83.1 Sailing times
Bilateral sailing times were calculated by the author. The world was divided into a matrix of 0.5
by 0.5 degree squares. For each square, CIESIN data3 were used to identify whether it was land
or sea, IFREMER provided data on the average velocity and direction of the sea-surface winds in
each season4, and NCAR provided the same information on ocean currents5.
The sailing time from each oceanic square to each of the eight adjacent squares on the grid was
calculated under two assumptions. First, the speed of the vessel was determined by the velocity and
direction of the wind along the path according to the speci￿c polar diagram of the vessel. Second,
the speed of the average ocean current was added. The world matrix was then transformed into a
weighted, directed graph in which every half-degree square is a node and in which the travel times
to adjacent squares are the edges￿weights.
Sixteen graphs were constructed to account for the two sailing technologies (sail versus steam
vessels), the four seasons and the inclusion/exclusion of the Suez Canal as a valid path. Given any
two nodes in the graph, Djikstra￿ s algorithm was then used to compute the shortest travel time.
After identifying the primary ports for each country, I calculated all pairwise minimum travel
times. Identifying the primary ports for each country was straightforward, and for the majority of
countries, the choice of port would not change the results. The exceptions were countries with the
longest coastlines and those bordering two or more oceans. For these countries, all of the primary
ports in 1850 were considered. The minimum travel time between two countries was then computed
as the minimum travel time across the seasons and ports of both countries. As sailing vessels are
unable to sail through the Suez Canal, there are three di⁄erent sets of shipping times: times by sail,
times by steam with the Suez Canal closed and times by steam with the Suez Canal open6. Figure
3http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/povmap
4http://cersat.ifremer.fr
5http://www.nodc.noaa.gov/General/current.html
6The optimized routes were compared with a set of actual routes described in 824 logbooks that were digitalized
in the CLIWOC dataset (referring to sailing vessels navigating between 1830 and 1860). The results showed a strong
￿t. Even after controlling for geographic distance, I found a correlation above 0.8 between actual and estimated
sailing times.
Notice that I could not use directly the sailing time of these vojages in the empirical analysis because (1) they were
available for a very small subset of country pairs (less than 2 percent) (2) the stopping ports in these vojages were
9(7) shows the optimized routes by sailing vessels between England, Cape of Good Hope and Java.
The accuracy of the optimization is con￿rmed by the fact that these optimal routes can perfectly
reproduce the routes followed by the real journeys of British sailing ships shown in Figure (4), both
in the Atlantic Ocean and in the Indian Ocean.
Table (1A) reports the summary statistics for this set of shipping times. It is noteworthy that
the introduction of the steamship reduced the average shipping time by more than half, and the
opening of the Suez Canal reduced this time by an additional twenty percent.
3.2 Trade data
A database for bilateral trade covering the entire second half of the nineteenth century was con-
structed by the author from a combination of primary and secondary sources. Table (1B) reports
the summary statistics for this set of data. Overall, the data consist of more than 23,000 bilateral
trade observations for nearly one thousand distinct country pairs. This database signi￿cantly im-
proves upon the trade data used in prior studies of the nineteenth century, as it is better suited to
identifying the impact of the steamship on trade patterns and development. The main reason is
its sheer size and time coverage. To date, the most comprehensive bilateral trade database for this
century is that constructed by Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008), covering 700 distinct country
pairs for the 1870-1900 period7. My data are superior in both dimensions of the panel: the number
of years and the country pairs. The most signi￿cant di⁄erence is that my data cover the entire
second half of the century, which is essential to capture the transition from sailing technology to
steam.
The trade dataset also comprises more than 5,000 entries on total imports and exports for 107
countries. These entries were used to compute the countries￿average exports within each decade
from 1850 to 1900. Descriptive statistics for this variable are reported in the ￿rst row of Table
dictated not only by geography but also by the map of economic development and this would have raised important
endogeneity issues.
7Other datasets on bilateral trade have been used in the literature. See Barbieri (1996), Lopez-Cordova and
Meissner. (2003) and Flandreau and Maurel (2001). All of these datasets begin after 1870, and with respect to
Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008), these datasets cover a much smaller number of dyads and are overwhelmingly
drawn from intra-European trade during the nineteenth century.
10(1C).
Several hundred documents were used to assemble this dataset, and these documents are de-
scribed in the online appendix. The most frequently used sources were series of statistical com-
pendia published by the British, French, American, Belgian, Dutch, German and Swedish national
statistical institutes, but the author also relied on consular correspondence and a large number of
single-country monographic studies. The trade data were then converted into pounds sterling using
annual exchange rates provided by the British Board of Trade in numerous volumes of the Statis-
tical Abstract for the Principal and Other Foreign countries or by the Global Financial Database
and Ferguson and Schularick (2006).
3.3 Population, urbanization and per-capita GDP
This paper uses three di⁄erent measures of economic development: population, per-capita in-
come and urban population. The data on per-capita income were obtained from Maddison (2004),
whereas for population data, the paper uses a large number of di⁄erent sources that are listed in
the online appendix.
The data on urbanization are one of the novelties of this paper. In particular, this study uses
three di⁄erent measures of urbanization: the percentage of the population living in cities with
more than 25, 50 and 100 thousand citizens. Urbanization rate data were readily available for 41
countries from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson (2013)). For the
remaining 85 countries in the sample, these data were based on the evolution of city sizes from 1850
to 1900 for more than 5,000 di⁄erent cities. City-level data were obtained from a large number of
sources that are described in the online appendix.
The last 5 rows of Table (1C) report summary statistics on per-capita income, total population
and urban population. The data are averaged at the country-decade level. It should be noted that
although both total and urban population data are available for every country in the sample, data
on per-capita income are available only for a smaller subset of 52 countries (see Table (A.2) in the
appendix).
113.4 Institutions
An initial question concerns which aspect of political institutions should be the focus of the analysis.
Douglass North (1981) argues that high-quality institutions are a primary determinant of economic
performance because they serve two functions: supporting private contracts (contracting institu-
tions) and providing checks against expropriation by the government or other politically powerful
groups (property rights institutions). However, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), in an attempt to
determine the relative roles of contracting institutions versus property rights institutions, ￿nd that
only the latter have a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on long-term economic growth. For this reason, this paper
will focus on the quality of property rights institutions. The author coded political institutions
using the variable ￿Constraints on the Executive￿ , as de￿ned in the dataset POLITY IV. This
variable is designed to capture ￿institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief
executives.￿According to this criterion, better political institutions exhibit one or both of the fol-
lowing features: the holder of executive power is accountable to bodies of political representatives
or to citizens, and/or government authority is constrained by checks and balances and by the rule
of law. A potential disadvantage of this measure is that it primarily concerns constraints on the
executive while ignoring constraints on expropriation by other elites, including the legislature. As
in POLITY IV, the variable ￿Constraints on the Executive￿varies from 1 (unlimited authority)
to 7 (accountable executive constrained by checks and balances). Higher values thus correspond
to better institutions. The online appendix provides additional information on the coding of this
variable. For approximately one-third of the countries in the sample, the variable was already
available in the Polity IV dataset, and the author coded this variable for the other countries.
4 The steamships and the e⁄ects on trade
4.1 The shift from sail to steam
The historical literature on when the introduction of steam technology to maritime transportation
became relevant for international trade is divided. Graham (1956) and Walton (1970) argue that
12the transition from sail to steam was a slow and protracted process and was the result of the
continuous improvements in the fuel consumption of marine engines that occurred throughout the
second half of the century. By contrast, Fletcher (1958) and Knauerhase (1968) argue that the
transition occurred fairly suddenly in the 1870s. In particular, Knauerhase attributes this change
to the introduction of the compound engine, whereas Fletcher posits that it was the catalytic e⁄ect
of the construction of the Suez Canal in 1860, which was suitable for steam vessels but not for
sailing vessels.
Rather than assuming a particular position in this debate, I will use a gravity-type regression
to determine when the distances in terms of the time to sail by steamship became relevant in
explaining patterns of trade worldwide. The gravity model is an empirical workhorse in the trade
literature. Practically, trade between two countries is inversely related to the distance between
them and positively related to their economic size. The following is a basic expression for bilateral
trade:
ln(tradeijt) = ln(yit) + ln(yjt) + ln(ywt) + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(￿ijt + lnPit + lnPjt) + "ijt (1)
where tradeijt denotes the export from country i to country j, yit and ywt are the GDP of country
i and of the world, ￿ijt is the bilateral resistance term (and captures all pair-speci￿c trade barriers
such as trade distance, common language, shared border, and colonial ties), Pit and Pjt are the
country-speci￿c multilateral resistance terms that are intended to capture a weighted average of
the trade barriers of a given country.
This speci￿cation emerges from several micro-founded trade models (see, for instance, Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) and Eaton and Kortum (2002)). These models typically imply a set of
predictions regarding trade diversion and trade creation. First, exports from i to j are increased
when the bilateral resistance term ￿ijt declines relative to the multilateral resistance terms Pit
and Pjt. Second, as world trade is homogenous of degree zero in the bilateral resistance terms,
international trade will increase only when international frictions ￿ijt and ￿jit decline relative to
13intranational frictions ￿iit and ￿jjt. Note that the introduction of the steamship was responsible
for both a change in the relative bilateral frictions across countries and a reduction in international
frictions relative to intranational frictions, as the steamship was utilized disproportionately more
for international shipping than for domestic shipping.
Although the majority of international trade is shipped by sea, the vast majority of estimated
gravity models assume that the bilateral resistance term is a function of point-to-point great circle
distances rather than navigation distances. By contrast, this paper assumes that this term is
a function of shipping times by both sail and steam vessels. In particular, I will estimate the
following equation:
ln(tradeijt) = ￿steam;T ln(steamTIMEij) + ￿sail;T ln(sailTIMEij) + Xit￿ + ￿t + "ijt (2)
where steamTIMEij and sailTIMEij are the sailing times from country i to country j by steam
and sailing vessels, respectively, and Xit indexes a set of variables to control for the P and y terms
in the original gravity equation. Note that the coe¢ cients on the two distances are allowed to vary
over time -every ten or ￿ve years- to capture changes in the navigation technology from sail to
steam.
The results of these regressions are presented in Tables (A.3) and (A.4) in the appendix. Speci￿-
cally, Table (A.3) presents the sequence of estimated coe¢ cients on shipping times by sail and steam
and their standard errors when the coe¢ cient on sailing times is allowed to vary every 10 years,
and Table (A.4) presents the results when the same coe¢ cient is allowed to vary every 5 years.
Because the results are consistent across the two tables, I will focus on the ￿rst set of regressions.
In the benchmark speci￿cation, the P and y terms are controlled using country (importer and
exporter) and year ￿xed e⁄ects. Figure (8) plots the sequence of the estimated coe¢ cients on
shipping times (the error bars represent two standard errors around the point estimates). The
coe¢ cient on shipping time by sail is negative and signi￿cant between 1850 and 1860 (-0.79), it
14increases between 1860 and 1870 (to -0.29), and it becomes insigni￿cant thereafter. In the same
￿gure, the coe¢ cient on shipping time by steam is initially insigni￿cant between 1850 and 1860,
becomes negative and signi￿cant between 1860 and 1870 (-0.39), decreases between 1870 and 1880
(-0.76), and then remains at similar levels until 19008. This evidence is consistent with the view of
a rapid change toward steam in the maritime transportation industry in the 1870s.
A potential concern with this speci￿cation is that countries￿ relative sizes and multilateral
resistance change over time. If these relative changes are correlated with shipping distances by
sail and steam, then the estimates in Figure (8) may be biased. For this reason, I supplement
this speci￿cation with country-by-year ￿xed e⁄ects. Figure (9) indicates that from a qualitative
perspective, the results are only slightly a⁄ected. In a practical sense, the only di⁄erence is that
in this new speci￿cation, the coe¢ cient on shipping times by steam is positive and signi￿cant in
1860. This anomaly is consistent with the failure to reject a false null hypothesis with 5 percent
probability.
Finally, the coe¢ cients plotted in Figure (10) come from a regression that includes year and
bilateral pair dummies. In this case, the absolute level of the elasticities of sailing times cannot be
captured; instead, it is possible to observe only their change over time. For this reason, the level in
1860 is standardized to 0. These estimates match the previous ￿ndings. Over time, country pairs
that were relatively closer by steam than by sail experienced the greatest increase in trade.9
Overall, these results corroborate the view that the introduction of the steamship in the shipping
industry was responsible for a substantial change in trade patterns during the 1870s.
4.2 The steamship and the ￿rst wave of globalization
The previous section emphasized that the steamship reshaped global trade patterns around 1870.
Circa this period, per-capita international trade increased threefold. Is there a causal link between
8Controlling for great circle distances across pairs does not alter the results (see column 2 in Tables (A.3) and
(A.4)). It is noteworthy that when shipping times are considered, geographic distance no longer exerts a negative
e⁄ect on bilateral trade.
9The Figures (A.1)-(A.3) in the appendix (and Table (A.4)) report the same estimates as Figures (8)-(10) with
the only change that now the coe¢ cients on sailing times are allowed to vary every 5 years rather than 10 years.
15these two observations? What extent of the increase in international trade is explained by the shift
from sail to steam in the maritime industry? Estervadeordal et al. (2003) argue that a general
equilibrium gravity model of international trade implies that 57 percent of the world trade boom
between 1870 and 1913 can be explained by income growth. The adoption of several currency
unions and declining freight rates each roughly account for one-third of the remaining part, the
rest being explained by income convergence and tari⁄ reductions. A more recent work by Jacks
et al. (2011) corrects the estimates obtained by Estavadeordal et al. using a more comprehensive
dataset on freight rates for the same period and ￿nds the e⁄ect of the maritime transport revolution
on the late nineteenth century global trade boom to be trivial. Other studies focused on global
market integration￿ the convergence of prices across markets￿ rather than on trade and trade
shares. Jacks (2006) presents evidence from a number of North Atlantic grain markets between
1800 and 1913, indicating that changes in freight costs can explain only a relatively modest fraction
of the changes in trade costs occurring in those markets. Using similar data, Federico and Persson
(2007) conclude that changes in trade policies were the single most important factor explaining the
convergence and divergence of prices in the long term.
Given these studies, one may argue that the steamship played a marginal role in the trade boom
of 1870. In this section, I will challenge this view. All of the abovementioned studies used changes
in freight rates to proxy for changes in transportation costs. The disadvantage of this approach is
that freight rates are simply prices for transport services and, as such, are likely to respond not only
to technology shocks but also to shifts in the demand schedule for shipping services and changes
in the market structure in the shipping industry. Both of these confounding factors were present
in 1870. First, the adoption of the gold standard, income growth and more liberal trade policies
may have generated an outward shift in the demand for shipping services. Second, beginning in the
1870s, rate schedules and shipping capacity for overseas freight on a number of trade routes began
to be established by shipping line conferences/cartels. Every main trade route between regions
had its own shipping conference organization composed of all the shipping lines that served the
route. Morton (1997) explains as follows: ￿The purpose of the shipping conference was to set rates
16and sailing schedules to which each line would adhere. The cartel also allocated market shares of
speci￿c types of goods and decided the exact ports to be served by each member line [. . . ] By
the turn of the century most shipping routes had been cartelized [. . . ].￿Morton notes that these
shipping conferences were able to establish prices above marginal costs and to control shipments
such that members were extracting monopolistic rents. Defying the cartel was di¢ cult, and most
conferences would share revenues. Finally, entry was generally prevented through price predation,
although some entrants were formally admitted to the cartel without con￿ ict (Podolny and Morton
(1999)).
Given the contemporaneous shift in the demand for shipping services and the change in market
structure, it is not surprising that the introduction of the steamship did not immediately translate
into a sharp reduction in the price of shipping services. For instance, the North￿ s freight index of
American export routes declined at the beginning of the nineteenth century and remained stable
between 1850 and 1880, whereas Harley￿ s British index declined more rapidly after 1850, well before
the introduction of the steamship on a major trade route. Neither index exhibited a structural
break between 1865 and 1875, although the number of steamers that were constructed increased
signi￿cantly during this period, while the construction of larger sailing ships nearly ceased.10
In this section, I will measure the e⁄ect of the introduction of the steamship on the trade boom
during the second half of the nineteenth century by relying on an actual measure of technological
improvement￿ the reduction in sailing times as a result of this new technology￿ rather than on
freight rate indexes. This approach has several advantages. First, the change in sailing times is
arguably exogenous with respect to the demand for shipping services and the market structure in
the shipping industry, as this change is the result of prevailing wind patterns and ocean currents.
Second, freight rates are not available for a su¢ ciently large number of countries prior to the mass
introduction of the steamship in trade, whereas sailing times are available. Third, changes in freight
rate indexes constructed at the country or country-pair level are likely to re￿ ect not only changes
10For instance, in the Angier Brothers￿freight report for 1871, we read the following: ￿The number of new sailing
vessels is unprecedentedly small, whereas the increase in the number of steamers is almost double that of any preceding
years.￿See also Figure (6).
17in freight rates but also changes in the composition of trade.
To estimate the e⁄ect of the reduction in shipping times induced by the introduction of the
steamship on the change in international trade volumes, I estimate the following regression:
￿logTi = ￿￿logDisti + ￿i (3)
where ￿logTi is the log-change in per-capita trade (imports plus exports) of country i between
1860 and 1900 and ￿logDisti is the average change in shipping times across all trading partners
(weighted by their share of world trade) generated by the introduction of the steamship:
￿logDisti ￿
P
i6=j
wj [ln(sailTIMEij) ￿ ln(steamTIMEij)] (4)
The elasticity ￿ can be interpreted as the e⁄ect of the introduction of the steamship on international
trade by reducing sailing time, under the assumption that all international trade was carried by
sailing vessels in 1860 and by steam vessels in 1900. Because a smaller portion of international
trade was still conducted by sail in 1900 or was shipped by land (or river), estimates of the e⁄ects
of the steamship are likely to be downward biased.
The results are reported in Figure (11) and in the ￿rst column of Table (2). The e⁄ect of
isolation on trade is negative and highly signi￿cant. Increasing the average time to reach a country
by one standard deviation (which is analogous to moving from France to Cuba) implies a reduction
in per-capita trade on the order of 55 percent. Columns 2 to 4 of Table (2) indicate that the
results do not vary according to the particular weights selected to aggregate sailing times across
the di⁄erent trading partners. In column 2, I restrict my attention to sailing times to and from the
UK, which was the primary trading country during this period. In the following two columns, I
limit the weighted sailing times to the top 5 and top 10 trading countries. In all cases, the e⁄ect of
isolation remains negative and signi￿cant, although the estimated elasticity oscillates between -1.3
and -1.9. Finally, columns 5 to 8 report the results of the same regressions when the observations
are weighted by the log of the countries￿total populations. The results are generally una⁄ected.
18Using sailing times rather than freight rates comes at a cost. If we do not make an assumption
regarding the exact relationship between sailing times and transportation costs, then it is not
possible to infer the role of changes in transportation costs on the trade boom from the estimates
in Table (2). However, my estimates can be used to infer the role of the introduction of steam vessels.
The median log-change in per-capita trade between 1860 and 1900 in my sample of countries is
1.20. If we assume that the steamship in 1900 is, on average, 50 percent faster than the sailing
vessels active in 1860 (a conservative ￿gure, see Stopford (2009), p. 28-29), then my estimates
imply that the steamship is responsible for at least 53 percent (-0.5*-1.28/1.20) of the trade boom
that occurred over these four decades. This number is surprisingly large compared with previous
estimates described at the beginning of the section.
5 Trade and Economic Development
Thus, the steamship was largely responsible for the unprecedented increase in international trade
that occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century. The aim of this section is thus to
evaluate the e⁄ect of this trade boom on economic development. The basic estimating equation is
as follows:
log(1 + Yit) = ￿ logTit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it (5)
where Yit is a measure of economic development (the urbanization rate, population density or per-
capita GDP).11 To identify the causal e⁄ect, this equation is estimated by 2SLS, instrumenting
country i￿ s actual trade in year t with the components of country i￿ s trade that is explained by
the geographic isolation of the country, as determined by the prevailing shipping technology in
t. Speci￿cally, I isolate the geographic component of country i￿ s bilateral trade with the other
countries in year t using the following formula:
11Note data on Yit are available only for the years 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890 and 1900.
19logPTijt = b ￿steam;t ln(steamTIMEij) + b ￿sail;t ln(sailTIMEij) (6)
The geographic component of a country￿ s total trade is then computed as the weighted average
of these bilateral components across all of country i￿ s potential trading partners using the partners￿
shares in total world trade as weights:
logPTit =
P
i6=j
wj logPTijt (7)
Note that the instrument for trade, logPTit, is time varying. Within-country variation is
generated by the shift from sail to steam vessels, which induces a change in the bilateral shipping
time across countries and, through this channel, a shift in the relative level of geographic isolation
of countries worldwide. The time-varying nature of the instrument implies that, in contrast to the
approach used by Frankel and Romer, country ￿xed e⁄ects can be added to equation (5).
Table (3) presents the 2SLS estimates of the elasticity of the urbanization rate with respect
to trade12. Urbanization rates are de￿ned as the share of the population living in cities with
at least 25 thousand citizens (columns 1 and 2), 50 thousand citizens (columns 3 and 4) or 100
thousand citizens (columns 5 and 6). In columns 2, 4 and 6, the observations are weighted by
the total population of the country. In each case, the ￿rst stage is strong, with F-statistics clearly
exceeding 10, the standard threshold for a strong instrument as suggested by Staiger and Stock
(1997). Surprisingly, the e⁄ect of trade on urbanization rates is negative. An increase in per-capita
trade on the order of 1 percent produces a decrease in urbanization rates between -0.06 and -0.08.
A potential concern with using urbanization rates as a proxy for economic development is that
the ￿rst wave of globalization induced the majority of countries outside of Europe to specialize
in commodity exports. The extent of de-industrialization in these countries was massive (see
Williamson (2011)), which could explain the negative average e⁄ects of trade on urbanization
rates. However, this does not prevent the occurrence of gains from trade.
12For the reduced form estimates, see Table (A.5) in the Appendix.
20More traditional measures of economic development are population density in a Malthusian
economy and per-capita GDP in a post-Malthusian economy. Table (4) examines the e⁄ect of
trade on both measures. Columns 1 and 2 document a negative e⁄ect on population density,
whereas columns 3 and 4 indicate a negative e⁄ect on per-capita income. (Note that GDP data are
available for approximately one-third of the sample.) To highlight the importance of the time-series
dimension of the instrument in studying the e⁄ect of trade on economic development, I repeat the
analysis in the last two columns using sea distance as an instrument in the spirit of Frankel and
Romer￿ s seminal work, and I omit country ￿xed e⁄ects. The e⁄ect of trade becomes positive and
signi￿cant, as in the previous contribution.
The ￿nding that the e⁄ect of the ￿rst wave of globalization could be negative on average
is surprising. In a previous study, Williamson (2011) documents a negative correlation between
growth in the terms of trade (generated by the increased trade) and per-capita GDP growth in a
large set of developing countries between 1870 and 1939. However, to the best of my knowledge,
the current study is the ￿rst to document a negative causal e⁄ect.
The question that naturally follows is whether the e⁄ect of trade was negative for all countries
or whether certain countries actually bene￿tted from trade. Table (5) indicates that the negative
e⁄ect of trade on urbanization rates and population density cannot be found in independent states.
Unreported regressions also demonstrate that although trade tends to be detrimental in Africa,
Central America and Asia, it is actually bene￿cial in Western Europe and North America. This
result appears to suggest that well-functioning institutions are crucial for a country to bene￿t from
trade.
To test this hypothesis, the following regression is estimated by 2SLS:
log(1 + Yit) = ￿0 logTit + ￿1 logTit ￿ I(Good Insti) + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it (8)
where I(Good Insti) is a dummy that identi￿es those countries in which executive power is con-
strained by checks and balances and by the rule of law. Speci￿cally, I(Good Insti) equals one if
21the POLITY IV variable "Constraints on the executive" is equal to or above 5 (on a scale of 1 to
7) for country i in 1860. The ￿rst stage is given by the following system of equations:
logTit = ￿11 logPTit + ￿12 logPTit ￿ Settl Morti + ￿i + ￿t + "1it (9)
logTit ￿ I(Good Insti) = ￿21 logPTit + ￿22 logPTit ￿ Settl Morti + ￿i + ￿t + "2it (10)
where Settl Morti is the mortality of the ￿rst European settlers in country i. Acemoglu et al.
(2001) has already documented the e⁄ect of the mortality of early settlers on the development of
political institutions. The identifying assumption is that, conditional on country and year ￿xed
e⁄ects, the mortality of the ￿rst settlers a⁄ected the way in which urbanization and development
in country i reacted to globalization, only through its e⁄ects on local institutions.
Table (6) con￿rms that in countries characterized by inclusive institutions, trade had large
positive e⁄ects on urbanization rates and population density, whereas the opposite occurred in
countries characterized by autocratic regimes. Speci￿cally, in autocracies, an exogenous doubling
of international trade produced a reduction in urbanization rates on the order of 15 to 16 percent
and a reduction in population density on the order of 270 to 320 percent. In countries with inclusive
institutions, the same change resulted in an increase in urbanization rates on the order of 11 to 17
percent and an increase in population density on the order of 9 to 17 percent. Moreover, this result
is robust to di⁄erent de￿nitions of urbanization rates and to the weighting of observations by each
country￿ s population. Finally, the results are qualitatively unchanged if we employ a less restrictive
de￿nition of countries with inclusive institutions and apply it to countries with a POLITY IV index
equal to or above 3 (see Table (A.6) in the appendix).
226 Conclusions
What factors drove globalization in the late nineteenth century? How did the rise in international
trade after 1870 in￿ uence economic development? This work addressed these two questions us-
ing a new dataset on shipping times, trade and urbanization and a novel identi￿cation strategy:
the introduction of the steamship in the shipping industry reduced shipping costs and time in a
disproportionate manner across countries and trade routes.
I ￿nd that 1) the adoption of the steamship was the major reason for the ￿rst wave of trade
globalization, 2) the average e⁄ect of trade on urbanization and development was negative, and 3)
countries characterized by more inclusive institutions experienced large positive e⁄ects from trade.
The results in my empirical analysis are important both for researchers and for policy makers.
For researchers, this paper presents the ￿rst empirical study to identify the e⁄ects of the steamship
on trade and urbanization. Moreover, researchers will be able to exploit a new source of variation
in international trade that I argue is exogenous with respect to economic development for studying
the e⁄ects of trade on other economic/social outcomes, such as technology di⁄usion or con￿ icts. At
the turn of the millennium, the use of the term "globalization" has become commonplace; however,
the increasing interconnection that we observe in the world today is not a new phenomenon. The
late nineteenth century is an ideal testing ground in which to observe the e⁄ects that globalization
can have on economic development. In this study, I showed that the increase in international
trade, which was driven by a reduction in e⁄ective distances produced by the introduction of the
steamship, had heterogeneous e⁄ects on local economic development and urbanization patterns
(actually these e⁄ects were negative for the majority of countries). Policy makers who are willing
to learn from history are advised to consider that a reduction in trade barriers across countries does
not automatically produce large positive e⁄ects on economic development. High-quality institutions
are crucial to bene￿ting from trade
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27Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
PANEL A Unit of observation: country pair
Mean Median St Dev Min Max N
Shipping time - Sail (hours) 998.4265 893.7524 585.5888 4.254764 2432.06 14720
Shipping time - Steam - Suez closed 468.3061 412.2899 279.8317 2.439398 1054.479 14720
Shipping time - Steam - Suez copen 391.107 359.3146 220.6328 2.439398 1031.196 14720
Great Circle Distance (km) 8041.176 7873.039 4555.404 21.39538 19870.77 14720
PANEL B Unit of observation: country pair-year
Mean Median St Dev Min Max N
Export (thousands pounds) 2383.663 476.98 6145.27 .0375 138800 23016
PANEL C Unit of observation: country-decade
Mean Median St Dev Min Max N
Total Exports (thousands dollars) 79686.47 13446.03 204005.2 13.4976 1699200 458
Total Population (thousands) 11515.67 968 44980.68 2.2 410536 702
Urban Population (>25000 citizens) 818.6339 53.66667 2570.383 0 20695 702
Urban Population (>50000 citizens) 641.3423 0 2102.135 0 17354.11 702
Urban Population (>100000 citizens) 499.9734 0 1728.634 0 14308.25 702
Per-capita income (1990 Intern. $) 1756.418 1508 1021.954 439 4492 146
PANEL D Unit of observation: country
Mean Median St Dev Min Max N
Constraints on the executive (1860) 3.688073 3 2.355833 1 1 109
Colony (1860) .5045872 1 .5022883 .0 1 109
Mortality of early settlers (log) 4.090228 4.26268 1.332422 .9360933 7.602901 72
28Table 2: Geographical Isolation and Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. variable = Log Change Trade
Log-Change Distance -1.578** -1.416**
(Weighted average) (0.675) (0.608)
Log-Change Distance -1.374** -1.182**
(GBR) (0.517) (0.465)
Log-Change Distance -1.913** -1.708**
(Top 5 trade countries) (0.777) (0.723)
Log-Change Distance -1.285** -1.216**
(Top 10 trade countries) (0.499) (0.444
Intercept -1.011* -0.808* -1.187* -0.861* -0.799 -0.583 -0.962 -0.744*
(0.563) (0.421) (0.606) (0.455) (0.522) (0.396) (0.583) (0.426)
r2 0.0734 0.0943 0.0806 0.0878 0.0730 0.0867 0.0748 0.0982
N 71 70 71 71 71 70 71 71
WEIGHTED (by Log Population) NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is the country. The dependent variable is the log-change in
per-capita trade (import plus exports) of the country between 1860 and 1900. "Log-Change Distance" is the weighted
average of the log changes in shipping times between the country and the other countries of the world generated by
the introduction of the steamship (see equation 4). Observations are un-weighted in columns 1-4 and weighted by
the log-population of the country in columns 5-8. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** signi￿cant
at less than 1 percent; ** signi￿cant at 5 percent; * signi￿cant at 10 percent.
Table 3: Trade and Urbanization Rates
PANEL A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban Pop (>25000) Urban Pop (>50000) Urban Pop (>100000)
Log Trade -0.0799*** -0.0587*** -0.0683* -0.0562*** -0.0735*** -0.0651***
(0.0395) (0.0297) (0.0350) (0.0271) (0.0370) (0.0293)
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES
r2 0.863 0.885 0.900 0.900 0.858 0.851
N 458 458 458 458 458 458
F 10.59 18.17 10.59 18.17 10.59 18.17
WEIGHTED NO YES NO YES NO YES
PANEL B
Log Predict. 0.408*** 0.464*** 0.408*** 0.464*** 0.408*** 0.464***
Trade (0.0974) (0.0844) (0.0974) (0.0844) (0.0974) (0.0844)
The table reports 2SLS. The unit of observation is country-year. The dependent variable is the log of the population
share living in cities with more than either 25,000 citizens (columns 1 and 2), or 50,000 citizens (columns 3 and
4), or 100,000 citizens (columns 5 and 6). "Log Trade" is the log of per-capita trade (import plus export). "Log
Predict Trade" is constructed according to equation 6. Observations are un-weighted in columns 1,3 and 5 and
weighted by the log-population of the country in columns 2, 4 and 6. Panel A reports the second-stage estimates.
F is the F statistics for weak identi￿cation. Panel B reports the ￿rst-stage estimates. Standard errors (reported
in parentheses) are two-way clustered (country and year). *** signi￿cant at less than 1 percent; ** signi￿cant at 5
percent; * signi￿cant at 10 percent.
29Table 4: Trade and Development
PANEL A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Population Density Per-Capita GDP
Log Trade -2.015*** -1.712*** -0.426 -0.424*** 0.538*** 0.481***
(0.509) (0.375) (0.278) (0.212) (0.170) (0.110)
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES NO NO
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES
r2 0.936 0.956 0.963 0.964 0.556 0.636
N 458 458 147 147 147 147
F 10.59 18.17 4.360 23.76 1.841 3.566
WEIGHTED NO YES NO YES NO YES
PANEL B
Log Predict. 0.408*** 0.464*** 0.250*** 0.295***
Trade (0.0974) (0.0844) (0.0858) (0.0434)
Sea Distance -0.477 -0.683***
(0.309) (0.318)
The table reports 2SLS. The unit of observation is country-year. The dependent variable is the log of either population
density or per-capita GDP. "Log Trade" is the log of per-capita trade (import plus export). "Log Predict Trade"
is constructed according to equation 6. Observations are un-weighted in columns 1,3 and 5 and weighted by the
log-population of the country in columns 2, 4 and 6. Panel A reports the second-stage estimates. F is the F statistics
for weak identi￿cation. Panel B reports the ￿rst-stage estimates. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
two-way clustered (country and year). *** signi￿cant at less than 1 percent; ** signi￿cant at 5 percent; * signi￿cant
at 10 percent.
Table 5: Trade and Urbanization: Colonies vs Independent States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Urban Pop (>25000) Urban Pop (>50000) Urban Pop (>100000) Population Density
Log Trade -0.313*** -0.247*** -0.293* -0.242* -0.358 -0.300* -3.284 -2.413
(0.155) (0.123) (0.155) (0.125) (0.218) (0.181) (2.174) (1.512)
Log Trade*Independent (1900) 0.345 0.252 0.332 0.249 0.422 0.314 1.520 0.685
(0.299) (0.202) (0.276) (0.196) (0.378) (0.271) (3.144) (1.809)
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
r2 0.520 0.686 0.570 0.687 0.250 0.444 0.877 0.931
N 458 458 458 458 458 458 472 472
F 0.949 0.907 0.949 0.907 0.949 0.907 1.043 1.030
WEIGHTED NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
The table reports 2SLS. The unit of observation is country-year. The dependent variable is the log of the population
share living in cities with more than either 25,000 citizens (columns 1 and 2), or 50,000 citizens (columns 3 and 4),
or 100,000 citizens (columns 5 and 6) or the log of population density (columns 7 and 8). "Log Trade" is the log
of per-capita trade (import plus export). "Independent (1900)" is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the country was
independent in 1900. The excluded instrument is constructed according to equation 6. Observations are un-weighted
in columns 1,3, 5 and 7 and weighted by the log-population of the country in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. F is the F
statistics for weak identi￿cation. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are two-way clustered (country and year).
*** signi￿cant at less than 1 percent; ** signi￿cant at 5 percent; * signi￿cant at 10 percent.
30Table 6: Trade and Urbanization: the Role of Local Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Urb. Pop (>25t) Urb. Pop (>50t) Urb. Pop (>100t) Population Density
Log Trade -0.161*** -0.156*** -0.146* -0.154* -0.149* -0.148* -2.875*** -2.578***
(0.0729) (0.0722) (0.0801) (0.0865) (0.0866) (0.0778) (0.776) (0.651)
Log Trade 0.282*** 0.299*** 0.254*** 0.320*** 0.286*** 0.277*** 3.042*** 2.669***
* Good Inst (Polity>=5) (0.0826) (0.0806) (0.0981) (0.123) (0.123) (0.0904) (0.674) (0.627)
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F 6.171 6.575 6.171 6.575 6.171 6.575 6.116 6.129
N 312 312 312 312 312 312 320 320
r2 0.777 0.758 0.810 0.663 0.728 0.769 0.928 0.946
WEIGHTED NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
The table reports 2SLS. The unit of observation is country-year. The dependent variable is the log of the population
share living in cities with more than either 25,000 citizens (columns 1 and 2), or 50,000 citizens (columns 3 and
4), or 100,000 citizens (columns 5 and 6) or the log of population density (columns 7 and 8). "Log Trade" is the
log of per-capita trade (import plus export)."Good Inst" is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the POLITY IV variable
"Constraints on the executive" was not lower than 5 in 1860. The excluded instrument is constructed according to
equation 6. Observations are un-weighted in columns 1,3, 5 and 7 and weighted by the log-population of the country
in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. F is the F statistics for weak identi￿cation. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
two-way clustered (country and year). *** signi￿cant at less than 1 percent; ** signi￿cant at 5 percent; * signi￿cant
at 10 percent.
31Figure 1: World Trade from 1700 to 1970
Note: The "lower bound" and "upper bound" series from 1700 to 1820 on export share (reported in Panel B) come
from Estevadeordal et al. (2003). In Panel (a) and Panel (c), these series were rescaled by the author using data on
world GDP and population (due to Maddison (2005)) to obtain lower and upper bound series on total export and
export-to-population ratio from 1700 to 1820.
32Figure 2: Polar diagram of a sailing vessel: the Clipper in 1860
The polar diagram de￿ne the maximum boat speed achievable for a given wind speed and wind angle.
Figure 3: Prevailing winds throughout the world in January
The ￿gure reports average wind in January (between 1995 and 2002), with direction de￿ned by the direction of the
arrow and speed by the lenght of the arrow.
33Figure 4: Shipping Routes by sailing ships
The ￿gure depicts 15 journeys made by British ships between 1800 and 1860. These journeys were randomly
selected from the CLIWOC dataset among all vojages between England and Java comprised in the dataset.
Figure 5: Coal consumption per horsepower per hour
Source: Graham (1956)
34Figure 6: Total tonnage of British vessels entered in British ports from and to foreign countries
and British possessions
Source: Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom (various years from 1851 to 1901)
Figure 7: Optimal routes for sailing vessels
The ￿gure depicts the optimized routes by Clipper between England, Cape of Good Hope and Java in the month of
January.
35Figure 8: The Change in Elasticity of Trade with Respect to Shipping Times by Sail and Steam
Vessels (Estimates from a gravity model with country and year ￿xed e⁄ects)
Figure 9: The Change in Elasticity of Trade with Respect to Shipping Times by Sail and Steam
Vessels (Estimates from a gravity model with country by year ￿xed e⁄ects)
36Figure 10: The Change in Elasticity of Trade with Respect to Shipping Times by Sail and Steam
Vessels (Estimates from a gravity model with country pair and year ￿xed e⁄ects)
37Figure 11: Geographic Isolation and Trade
The central line depicts the estimated marginal e⁄ect of the log change in the average shipping time from a country
to the rest of the world, induced by the steamship, on the log change in his per-capita trade (imports plus exports).
The other two lines de￿ne the 5 percent con￿dence boundaries.
38A Appendix
Table A.1: Percentage proportion of merchandise imported by land and by sea in 1900
Land and River Sea
Argentine 0.1 99.9
Belgium 52.8 47.2
British India 0.06 99.94
Denmark 2.8 97.2
France 31.9 68.1
Great Britain 0 100
Holland 49.4 50.6
Italy 33.5 66.5
Norway 6.9 93.1
Portugal 9.2 90.8
Russia 45 55
Spain 19.6 80.4
Sweden 1.9 98.1
United States 5 95
Uruguay 0.5 99.5
Source: Statistical abstract for the principal and other foreign countries (1901)
39Table A.2: Data available by country
Country Export Sail Urban GDP Total Constraints Settlers￿ Country
time populat. populat. executive mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Aden 1 1 1 1 Hong Kong 1 1 1 1 1
Albania 1 1 1 1 Iceland 1 1 1
Algeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 India 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Angola 1 1 1 1 1 1 I. Bengal 1 1 1 1 1 1
Arabia 1 1 1 I. Bombay 1 1 1 1 1 1
Argentina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I. Brit. Burma 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I. Madras 1 1 1 1 1 1
A. South Wales 1 1 1 1 1 1 I. Sind 1 1 1 1 1 1
A. Queensland 1 1 1 1 1 1 Italy 1 1 1 1 1
A. South Austr 1 1 1 1 1 1 Jamaica 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A. Victoria 1 1 1 1 1 1 Japan 1 1 1 1 1
A. Western Aust 1 1 1 1 1 1 Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Austria-Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 Kuwait 1 1 1
Azores 1 1 1 Labuan 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bahamas 1 1 1 1 1 1 Lagos 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bahrain 1 1 1 Liberia 1 1 1 1 1 1
Barbados 1 1 1 1 1 1 Libya 1 1 1 1
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 Macau 1 1 1
Benin 1 1 1 1 1 1 Madagascar 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bermuda 1 1 1 1 Malay States 1 1 1 1
Bolivia 1 1 1 1 1 1 Maldive Isl. 1 1 1
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Malta 1 1 1 1 1 1
British E. Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 Martinique 1 1 1 1
British Guiana 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mauritius 1 1 1 1 1 1
British Honduras 1 1 1 1 Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 Montenegro 1 1 1 1 1
Cameroon 1 1 1 1 Morocco 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mozambique 1 1 1
Canary Islands 1 1 1 Natal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cape G. Hope 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1
Ceylon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 New Caledon. 1 1 1 1
Channel Islands 1 1 1 New Zealand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Newfoundland 1 1 1 1 1 1
China 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Nicaragua 1 1 1 1 1 1
Colombia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Norway 1 1 1 1 1
Costa Rica 1 1 1 1 1 1 Oman 1 1 1
Cote d￿ Ivoire 1 1 1 1 1 Ottoman Emp. 1 1 1 1
Cuba 1 1 1 1 Panama 1 1 1 1
Cyprus 1 1 1 1 Persia 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 Peru 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dominican Rep. 1 1 1 1 1 1 Philippines 1 1 1 1 1
Dutch East Indie 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Portugal 1 1 1 1 1
D. E. I. Borneo 1 1 1 1 1 1 Puerto Rico 1 1 1 1
D. E. I. Java 1 1 1 1 1 1 Qatar 1 1 1
D. E. I. Sumatra 1 1 1 1 1 1 Reunion 1 1 1
Dutch Guiana 1 1 1 1 1 1 Romania 1 1 1 1 1
East Timor 1 1 1 Russia 1 1 1 1 1
Ecuador 1 1 1 1 1 1 Saint Pierre 1 1 1
Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Senegal 1 1 1 1 1 1
El Salvador 1 1 1 1 1 1 Seychelles 1 1 1 1
Fiji 1 1 1 1 1 1 Siam 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 Sierra Leone 1 1 1 1 1 1
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Somalia 1 1 1 1
French Guiana 1 1 1 1 Spain 1 1 1 1 1
Gambia 1 1 1 1 1 1 Straits Settl. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 Sweden 1 1 1 1 1
Gibraltar 1 1 1 1 Taiwan 1 1 1 1 1
Gold Coast 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tanzania 1 1 1 1 1 1
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 Togo 1 1 1 1
Greenland Faroe 1 1 1 Trinidad Tob. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Grenade 1 1 1 1 Tunisia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Guadaloupe 1 1 1 1 UK 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Guatemala 1 1 1 1 1 1 United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Haiti 1 1 1 1 1 1 Uruguay 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hawaii 1 1 1 1 Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Honduras 1 1 1 1 1 1 Virgin Islands 1 1 1 1
40Table A.3: The shift from sail to steam 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (export) ln (export) ln (export) ln (export)
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1855-1860) 0.265 0.0981 1.239
(0.465) (0.492) (0.920)
(0.480) (0.480) (0.847)
(0.197) (0.202) (0.468)***
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1860-1870) -0.392 -0.556 -0.195 -0.510
(0.267) (0.325)* (0.157) (0.422)
(0.310) (0.325)* (0.122) (0.462)
(0.111)*** (0.119)*** (0.0838)** (0.200)**
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1870-1880) -0.759 -0.922 -0.370 -0.872
(0.220)*** (0.288)*** (0.154)** (0.310)***
(0.217)*** (0.270)*** (0.144)** (0.340)**
(0.0684)*** (0.0806)*** (0.0576)*** (0.0993)***
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1880-1890) -0.868 -1.034 -0.410 -0.862
(0.239)*** (0.301)*** (0.161)** (0.310)***
(0.250)*** (0.316)*** (0.160)** (0.331)***
(0.0640)*** (0.0773)*** (0.0549)*** (0.0887)***
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1890-1900) -0.680 -0.843 -0.275 -0.657
(0.238)*** (0.320)*** (0.179) (0.275)**
(0.251)*** (0.329)** (0.193) (0.303)**
(0.0611)*** (0.0745)*** (0.0533)*** (0.0815)***
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1855-1860) -0.790 -0.748 -1.632
(0.482)* (0.477) (0.987)*
(0.476)* (0.469) (0.879)*
(0.202)*** (0.202)*** (0.446)***
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1860-1870) -0.209 -0.170 0.217 -0.142
(0.278) (0.274) (0.163) (0.445)
(0.296) (0.291) (0.128)* (0.481)
(0.114)* (0.115) (0.0815)*** (0.201)
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1870-1880) 0.0148 0.0451 0.320 0.102
(0.215) (0.211) (0.149)** (0.300)
(0.208) (0.204) (0.137)** (0.331)
(0.0682) (0.0686) (0.0495)*** (0.0976)
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1880-1890) 0.172 0.206 0.433 0.186
(0.229) (0.224) (0.154)*** (0.293)
(0.243) (0.242) (0.143)*** (0.323)
(0.0633)*** (0.0640)*** (0.0460)*** (0.0873)**
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1890-1900) 0.0228 0.0547 0.383 -0.0194
(0.230) (0.232) (0.165)** (0.269)
(0.090) (0.222) (0.163)** (0.298)
(0.0602) (0.0608) (0.0441)*** (0.0797)
ln (Geo Dist) 0.141
(0.193)
(0.169)
(0.0368)***
COUNTRY FE YES YES NO NO
YEAR FE YES YES YES NO
PAIR FE NO NO YES NO
COUNTRY X YEAR FE NO NO NO YES
R Squared 0.616 0.617 0.796 0.686
Observations 23016 23016 23016 23016
The table reports OLS estimates on yearly data (1855-1900). The following standard errors are reported in paren-
theses: 1) clustered at the country pair 2) clustered at the country of origin 3) robust; *** signi￿cant at less than 1
percent; ** signi￿cant at 5 percent; * signi￿cant at 10 percent.
41Table A.4: The shift from sail to steam 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (export) ln (export) ln (export) ln (export)
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1855-1860) 0.278 0.110 1.239
(0.470) (0.496) (0.921)
(0.486) (0.485) (0.848)
(0.197) (0.202) (0.468)***
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1860-1865) 0.0235 -0.144 -0.0271 0.400
(0.403) (0.432) (0.199) (0.808)
(0.488) (0.474) (0.203) (0.837)
(0.213) (0.217) (0.157) (0.484)
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1865-1870) -0.530 -0.695 -0.252 -0.673
(0.249)** (0.315)** (0.172) (0.391)*
(0.268)* (0.301)** (0.127)* (0.436)
(0.126)*** (0.133)*** (0.0949)*** (0.221)***
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1870-1875) -0.719 -0.884 -0.341 -0.867
(0.222)*** (0.292)*** (0.156)** (0.317)***
(0.212)*** (0.266)*** (0.142)** (0.359)**
(0.0943)*** (0.103)*** (0.0746)*** (0.147)***
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1875-1880) -0.794 -0.958 -0.399 -0.876
(0.225)*** (0.289)*** (0.162)** (0.314)***
(0.235)*** (0.285)*** (0.166)** (0.333)***
(0.0890)*** (0.0986)*** (0.0713)*** (0.135)***
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1880-1885) -0.878 -1.045 -0.419 -0.920
(0.238)*** (0.296)*** (0.167)** (0.322)***
(0.250)*** (0.312)*** (0.166)** (0.336)***
(0.0867)*** (0.0968)*** (0.0698)*** (0.130)***
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1885-1890) -0.856 -1.024 -0.405 -0.812
(0.248)*** (0.311)*** (0.168)** (0.319)**
(0.260)*** (0.327)*** (0.166)** (0.345)**
(0.0832)*** (0.0939)*** (0.0674)*** (0.121)***
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1890-1895) -0.735 -0.899 -0.315 -0.682
(0.237)*** (0.319)*** (0.181)* (0.278)**
(0.257)*** (0.336)*** (0.176)* (0.291)**
(0.0799)*** (0.0904)*** (0.0653)*** (0.115)***
ln(Steam Dist) x I(1895-1900) -0.624 -0.788 -0.236 -0.634
(0.245)** (0.327)** (0.187) (0.285)**
(0.256)** (0.330)** (0.223) (0.334)*
(0.0798)*** (0.0904)*** (0.0654)*** (0.115)***
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1855-1860) -0.802 -0.759 -1.632
(0.487)* (0.482) (0.987)*
(0.482)* (0.475) (0.880)*
(0.202)*** (0.202)*** (0.446)***
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1860-1865) -0.534 -0.492 0.0490 -0.856
(0.419) (0.413) (0.214) (0.868)
(0.490) (0.481) (0.224) (0.835)
(0.218)** (0.219)** (0.159) (0.468)*
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1865-1870) -0.119 -0.0813 0.272 -0.0110
(0.256) (0.253) (0.174) (0.402)
(0.253) (0.251) (0.126)** (0.453)
(0.130) (0.130) (0.0934)*** (0.223)
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1870-1875) -0.0232 0.00793 0.295 0.110
(0.219) (0.216) (0.150)* (0.308)
(0.204) (0.201) (0.141)** (0.352)
(0.0944) (0.0947) (0.0687)*** (0.144)
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1875-1880) 0.0465 0.0766 0.343 0.0941
(0.218) (0.213) (0.158)** (0.304)
(0.226) (0.220) (0.153)** (0.325)
(0.0888) (0.0892) (0.0649)*** (0.133)
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1880-1885) 0.185 0.218 0.430 0.221
(0.231) (0.225) (0.161)*** (0.308)
(0.243) (0.241) (0.152)*** (0.330)
(0.0861)** (0.0865)** (0.0630)*** (0.128)*
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1885-1890) 0.158 0.193 0.436 0.155
(0.237) (0.234) (0.159)*** (0.302)
(0.254) (0.255) (0.147)*** (0.337)
(0.0825)* (0.0830)** (0.0601)*** (0.119)
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1890-1895) 0.0747 0.107 0.407 0.0304
(0.228) (0.230) (0.165)** (0.270)
(0.251) (0.254) (0.150)*** (0.283)
(0.0790) (0.0794) (0.0577)*** (0.113)
ln(Sail Dist) x I(1895-1900) -0.0305 0.00189 0.359 -0.0666
(0.238) (0.240) (0.173)** (0.283)
(0.251) (0.253) (0.190)* (0.333)
(0.0787) (0.0791) (0.0578)*** (0.112)
ln (Geo Dist) 0.142
(0.193)
(0.170)
(0.0368)***
COUNTRY FE YES YES NO NO
YEAR FE YES YES YES NO
PAIR FE NO NO YES NO
COUNTRY X YEAR FE NO NO NO YES
R Squared 0.617 0.617 0.796 0.687
Observations 23016 23016 23016 23016
The table reports OLS estimates on yearly data (1855-1900). The following standard errors are reported in paren-
theses: 1) clustered at the country pair 2) clustered at the country of origin 3) robust; *** signi￿cant at less than 1
percent; ** signi￿cant at 5 percent; * signi￿cant at 10 percent.
42Table A.5: Trade and Urbanization Rates - Reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban Pop (>25000) Urban Pop (>50000) Urban Pop (>100000))
Log Pred. -0.0240*** -0.0247*** -0.0369*** -0.0384*** -0.0325*** -0.0343***
Trade (0.0105) (0.00971) (0.00980) (0.0100) (0.0109) (0.0110)
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES
r2 0.941 0.935 0.954 0.942 0.948 0.933
N 702 702 702 702 702 702
WEIGHTED NO YES NO YES NO YES
The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is country-year. The dependent variable is the log of
the population share living in cities with more than either 25,000 citizens (columns 1 and 2), or 50,000 citizens
(columns 3 and 4), or 100,000 citizens (columns 5 and 6). "Log Predict Trade" is constructed according to equation
6. Observations are un-weighted in columns 1,3 and 5 and weighted by the log-population of the country in columns
2, 4 and 6. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are two-way clustered (country and year). *** signi￿cant at
less than 1 percent; ** signi￿cant at 5 percent; * signi￿cant at 10 percent.
Table A.6: Trade and Urbanization: the Role of Local Institutions - Instrumenting Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Urb. Pop (>25t) Urb. Pop (>50t) Urb. Pop (>100t) Population
Log Trade -0.200* -0.183* -0.182* -0.183 -0.189 -0.173* -3.320*** -2.819***
(0.103) (0.0937) (0.109) (0.112) (0.119) (0.0985) (0.940) (0.750)
Log Trade 0.333*** 0.356*** 0.301*** 0.381*** 0.338*** 0.330*** 3.636*** 3.184***
* Good Inst (Polity>=3) (0.124) (0.121) (0.139) (0.171) (0.167) (0.133) (0.918) (0.822)
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F 3.327 3.040 3.327 3.040 3.327 3.040 3.392 2.917
N 312 312 312 312 312 312 320 320
r2 0.718 0.670 0.755 0.525 0.647 0.683 0.941 0.954
WEIGHTED NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
The table reports 2SLS. The unit of observation is country-year. The dependent variable is the log of the population
share living in cities with more than either 25,000 citizens (columns 1 and 2), or 50,000 citizens (columns 3 and
4), or 100,000 citizens (columns 5 and 6) or the log of population density (columns 7 and 8). "Log Trade" is the
log of per-capita trade (import plus export)."Good Inst" is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the POLITY IV variable
?Constraints on the executive? was not lower than 3 in 1860. The excluded instrument is constructed according to
equation 6. Observations are un-weighted in columns 1,3, 5 and 7 and weighted by the log-population of the country
in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. F is the F statistics for weak identi￿cation. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
two-way clustered (country and year). *** signi￿cant at less than 1 percent; ** signi￿cant at 5 percent; * signi￿cant
at 10 percent.
43Figure A.1: The Change in Elasticity of Trade with Respect to Shipping Times by Sail and Steam
Vessels (Estimates from a gravity model with country and year ￿xed e⁄ects)
Figure A.2: The Change in Elasticity of Trade with Respect to Shipping Times by Sail and Steam
Vessels (Estimates from a gravity model with country by year ￿xed e⁄ects)
44Figure A.3: The Change in Elasticity of Trade with Respect to Shipping Times by Sail and Steam
Vessels (Estimates from a gravity model with country pair and year ￿xed e⁄ects)
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